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Abstract 
 
Under a new Basel capital accord, bank regulators might use quantitative measures 
when evaluating the eligibility of internal credit rating systems for the internal ratings 
based approach. Based on data from Deutsche Bundesbank and using a simulation 
approach, we find that it is possible to identify strongly inferior rating systems out-of-
time based on statistics that measure either the quality of ranking borrowers from 
good to bad, or the quality of individual default probability forecasts. Banks do not 
significantly improve system quality if they use credit scores instead of ratings, or 
logistic regression default probability estimates instead of historical data. Banks that 
are not able to discriminate between high- and low-risk borrowers increase their 
average capital requirements due to the concavity of the capital requirements 
function. 
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0. Introduction 
Under the proposal of a new Basel capital accord (Basel Committee, 2003), banks 
will be allowed to use their own default probability estimates for regulatory capital 
calculation. Bank regulators will have to decide whether a bank’s internal credit rating 
system meets certain minimum requirements specified in the proposal. We 
implement quantitative measures to evaluate system quality. While these measures 
will not be sufficient to decide on a system’s admittance to the internal ratings based 
approach, they may serve as valuable and objective quality indicators. Bank 
regulators might carry out an analysis like ours to define threshold values in order to 
separate high-quality systems from low-quality ones. 
Based on Deutsche Bundesbank annual accounts and default data in the time period 
1994-99 of, on average, 24,000 medium-sized and large companies per year, we 
investigate whether it is possible to identify low-quality internal credit rating systems 
based on quantitative measures. In the course of the analysis, we treat two further 
research questions: First, should banks abandon their current practice of aggregating 
credit scores into rating classes, and of using historical default rates to estimate 
default probabilities instead of rating model derived estimates? Second, how does a 
rating system’s quality influence capital requirements? 
Our empirical approach proceeds as follows: We start by defining rating systems of 
different quality. We then choose a quantitative measure that summarizes system 
quality, and empirically simulate its distribution for the various systems defined. 
Finally, we compare the statistics’ distributions for high-quality systems with those for 
low-quality ones. If the distributions sufficiently differ, the quantitative measure 
performs well in discriminating between both kinds of systems. We perform our 
analysis for different bank sizes and different portfolio default rates.  
We evaluate the performance of three statistical measures that have been widely 
used in other fields of science (medicine, psychology, meteorology), but also in  
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economics
1: the area-under-curve (AUC), the Brier score, and the grouped Brier 
score.  
The AUC evaluates the ranking of borrowers from good to bad, while the Brier score 
evaluates individual default probability forecasts, and the grouped Brier score 
average rating class default probability forecasts. Each of the three measures is 
associated with a different economic loss function. As evaluations are sensitive to the 
loss function chosen
2, we need to analyze whether a given statistical measure makes 
sense economically. While the AUC dominates the current discussion, we find that 
the Brier score and the grouped Brier score are more closely related to the 
evaluator’s objectives. Regulatory capital requirements directly depend on default 
probability estimates, and therefore the error in default probability estimates ought to 
be measured in order to evaluate an internal credit rating system. 
The main result of our study is that it is possible to identify strongly inferior internal 
credit rating systems out-of-time based on both the AUC and the Brier score. For 
example, a rating system which is based on one randomly drawn financial ratio is 
identified as inferior with a high probability even if there are only three out-of-time 
defaults. The grouped Brier score does not work well in our study as it is exclusively 
concerned with precision and not with discriminatory power. Because average rating 
class default probabilities are relatively precisely measured even by the low-quality 
systems we define, the grouped Brier score is not able to discriminate between good 
and bad systems. 
The identification frequency of inferior systems depends positively on the number of 
out-of-time defaults meaning that it is similar if either a large portfolio with a low 
portfolio default rate or a small portfolio with a high portfolio default rate is taken.  
The identification frequency decreases considerably if more sophisticated systems 
are examined. For example, a system that uses the financial ratios of the Altman Z”-
score, which are selected based on U.S. data, is only recognized as being inferior 
                                                 
1 In economics, the AUC is used in (Sobehart et al., 2000), (Blochwitz et al., 2000), (Engelmann et al., 
2003). The Brier score is used in (Diebold and Rudebusch, 1989), (Winkler, 1994), (Lopez, 1999, 
2001). The grouped Brier score is used in (Diebold and Rudebusch, 1989). 
2 (Lopez, 2001)  
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with a high probability for large banks (51 or more out-of-time defaults). As none of 
the financial ratios used for the Altman Z”-score is chosen in a stepwise selection 
procedure based on the Deutsche Bundesbank database, this result is not 
satisfactory and reflects the limitations of our approach. 
Our results are derived for two different evaluation approaches. In the first approach, 
regulators simply set critical thresholds on the value of a quantitative measure. 
Performing worse than these thresholds indicates a system’s underperformance. In 
the second approach, regulators set critical thresholds on the p-values of tests of 
equality of a bank’s own system’s quality measures and the respective measures of a 
benchmark model calibrated by regulators. This approach is more complex than the 
first one. It performs worse in rejecting the system, which is based on one randomly 
drawn financial ratio, and better in rejecting the system based on the Altman Z”-score 
financial variables. 
With respect to  our additional research questions, we find that banks do not 
significantly improve their systems’ quality if they do not aggregate credit scores into 
rating classes, or if they use rating model derived default probability estimates 
instead of estimates based on internal default histories. These results accord with the 
current behaviour of many banks.  
Banks might have an incentive to use logistic regression default probability estimates 
instead of historical rating class default rates, if capital requirements can be lowered 
in this way. For one of the rating systems we define this is actually the case. A 
systematic underestimation of low default rates along with an overestimation of high 
default rates in connection with a concave capital requirements function, leads to 
lower average capital requirements. For all other systems capital requirements based 
on logistic regression default probability estimates are higher on average. These 
systematic differences also exist with probit regression and linear discriminant 
analysis, but can be overcome with a non-parametric approach. 
Concerning capital requirements, rating systems that are not able to discriminate 
between high and low risks are punished by higher capital requirements. This is also 
due to the concavity of the Basel II capital requirements function.   
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As far as we know, none of our research questions has so far been treated in the 
credit risk research literature. Therefore, we believe that our insights represent a 
contribution to the small body of papers on the validation of credit risk models. 
Related literature can be classified into four areas: first, classical papers on credit 
scoring; second, theoretical papers on the refinement of statistical tools for analyzing 
statistical default models; third, empirical papers applying refined assessment criteria; 
and fourth, papers discussing rating system evaluation procedures: 
1.  In the classical literature starting with (Altman, 1968) simple error rates are used 
for model validation. A review of this big body of literature along with a discussion 
of basic problems is given by (Rosenberg and Gleit, 1994).  
2.  Statistical tools that go beyond simple error rates are theoretically discussed in 
(DeLong et al., 1988) and (Swets, 1996), as representatives of studies in medical 
and psychological research, (Wilkie, 1992), (Hand, 1994, 1997), (Hand and 
Henley, 1997), (Sobehart et al., 2000), and (Engelmann, Hayden and Tasche, 
2003).   
3.  Recent empirical papers applying refined assessment criteria to credit risk include 
(Sobehart et al., 2000), (Blochwitz et al., 2000), and (Carey and Hrycay, 2001). 
(Sobehart et al., 2000) uses accuracy and entropy ratios to measure the accuracy 
of six different scoring and rating models, based on balance sheet and market 
information from public companies. (Blochwitz et al., 2000) use gini coefficients to 
compare Deutsche Bundesbank’s credit scoring system (discriminant analysis 
plus expert system) with the KMV private firm model using data from Deutsche 
Bundesbank. (Carey and Hrycay, 2001) empirically  examine properties of 
mapping- and scoring-model methods, which they use to estimate average 
default probabilities by rating grade, and present evidence of potential problems 
of bias, instability, and gaming. (Grunert, Norden and Weber, 2003) find that 
qualitative factors significantly increase the performance of internal credit rating 
systems based on a small sample of internal credit ratings given by four German 
banks in the time period 1992-1996 using Brier scores among other measures.  
4.  (RMA Capital Working Group, 2000) and (Carey, 2001) propose an alternative 
evaluation procedure for credit rating systems. In the peer group approach, banks 
are asked to provide ratings for a given sample of borrowers. Banks whose  
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ratings differ significantly from ratings  given by other banks are regarded as 
outliers and are further investigated. (Tabakis and Vinci, 2002) propose an 
intermediate approach: First, a set of publicly available financial variables is used 
to obtain a core rating, and then, additional information from peer group ratings is 
combined in a variance-minimizing way to obtain a benchmark rating.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data. In 
section 2, we define six kinds of internal credit rating systems differing in quality. 
Section 3 describes the quantitative measures we use. Section 4 presents the 
simulation set-up and simulation results and section 5 concludes.  
1. Data 
Deutsche Bundesbank’s annual accounts database is the most comprehensive 
collection of annual accounts of German non-financial companies. Nevertheless, due 
to its rediscount business origin, it is somewhat biased towards large public limited 
West German manufacturing companies, and thus not entirely representative of the 
German economy.
3  
An important characteristic of the database is that companies usually submit annual 
accounts based on tax law to Deutsche Bundesbank. While annual accounts based 
on commercial law generally have to be finished within three to six months after the 
end of the financial year, the compilation period for those based on tax law is 
generally up to one year. This characteristic causes problems for default prediction. If 
a company defaulted, e.g. in 1998, then it is quite probable that there are no annual 
accounts of 1997 in the database, and there might not even be annual accounts of 
1996. 
Default is defined as the formal initiation of insolvency proceedings. Default 
information is retrieved from public sources and incorporated into the database as 
soon as it becomes known. This default definition is narrower than the Basel II 
definition. There, default is additionally triggered if the obligor is unlikely to pay its 
debt obligations in full, without recourse by the bank to actions such as realising 
                                                 
3 (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1998)  
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security, or if the obligor is past due more than 90 days on any material credit.
4 As a 
consequence, default rates in the Deutsche Bundesbank database are relatively low. 
Our dataset contains annual accounts and default data of medium-sized and large 
German companies in the time period 1990-2000. Companies have to satisfy at least 
two of the following criteria: 
1.  total assets larger than 3,438 million Euros, 
2.  revenues larger than 6,875 million Euros, 
3.  a yearly average of more than 50 employees.
5 
Small companies are excluded from the dataset because they have more means of 
distorting annual accounts data than medium-sized and large companies. By 
focusing on medium-sized and large companies, we also reduce the problem that 
small business lending relies more on qualitative information, which we do not have.
6  
Companies that have once satisfied the size criterion are retained in later years even 
if the size criterion is no longer satisfied. This reflects the lending behaviour of banks 
that cannot easily get rid off a customer after granting a credit even if she no longer 
belongs to the target group, which is here defined by size. The proportion of annual 
accounts based on tax law equals 88%. 
The classification of annual accounts as solvent and insolvent, respectively, is based 
on a simplified view of a bank granting a loan to a company. If a company asks for a 
loan in  t=0 ( t being spaced in monthly intervals), the bank tries to predict the 
company’s default by  t=12 based on the company’s latest annual accounts (which 
are typically based on tax law). Since we define the compilation period for annual 
accounts based on tax law to equal one year, the time difference  d  between default 
and the latest annual accounts available lies in the interval  ] 24 , 1 [ ˛ d . For example, if 
                                                 
4 (Basel Committee, 2003), § 414 
5 §267 HGB (Handelsgesetzbuch / German Corporate Law) defining the size criterion for public limited 
companies. 
6 (Berger et al., 2003) provide empirical evidence for this point. Note that the minimum total assets in 
our sample is larger than the 75%-quantile of the sample of Berger et al. Furthermore, the primary 
empirical result refers to companies without financial statements, which do not exist in our sample.  
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the financial year ends on 31 December 2000, the annual accounts are compiled and 
submitted on 10 January 2001, the company is granted credit on 15 January 2001, 
and defaults on 20 January 2001, then  1 = d . If the company is granted a credit on 
15 December 2001, compiles and submits its annual accounts for the financial year 
ending in December 2000 on 20 December 2001, and defaults on 19 December 
2002, then  24 = d .  
1,446 annual accounts are classified as insolvent because they lie within the interval 
] 24 , 1 [ ˛ d . Since we do not have default information after January 2001, we are not 
able to classify annual accounts after 31 January 1999 as solvent or insolvent, which 
leads to a reduction in data available for default prediction. 
For the present study, we use data from 1994-1999. As banks and regulators are 
primarily interested in the future performance of internal credit rating systems, we 
divide the sample into a 1994-1998 training sample and a 1999 validation sample. 
The training sample time period of five years complies with the Basel II minimum 
historical time period.
7 While in retail credit a maximum of three years of data is 
commonly used to derive credit scoring functions,
8 the lack of default events in 
corporate credit forces especially small banks to use more years of data if available.  
The training sample consists of 98,910 observations of 29,607 companies with an 
average default rate of 0.58%. The validation sample consists of 18,671 observations 
(= companies) with an average default rate of 0.74%. 
Our credit scoring is based on a set of forty-eight financial variables, which have 
been found to be good default indicators in the German credit risk literature, and one 
variable from (Altman, 1968) (Table 1). Forty-one financial variables are taken from 
(Niehaus, 1987), three ratios from (Hüls, 1995), and four ratios from (Deutsche 
Bundesbank, 1999).  
Data input errors are handled by winsorizing financial ratios at the 0.5%- and the 
99.5%-quantile. Missing values are conservatively set to the 0.5% (99.5%)-quantile if 
low (high) values of the financial variable indicate high default risk. 
                                                 
7 (Basel Committee, 2003), § 425 
8 (Lewis, 1994), p. 35  
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2. Defining internal credit rating systems of different quality 
In our empirical approach, we define six kinds of qualitatively different internal credit 
rating systems (ordered in presumed ascending quality): the trivial system, the 
optimized Altman system, the Z-score system, the stepwise system, the benchmark 
variables system, and the pooled system. An overview over the main characteristics 
of the different system types is given in Table 2. 
For all systems we assume that banks use just one credit scoring function for all 
borrowers. This may be a strong assumption as annual accounts of, for example, 
manufacturing and trading companies differ structurally. For this reason, (Deutsche 
Bundesbank, 1999) derives three different scoring functions for manufacturing, 
trading, and other sectors. On the other hand, in the well-known ZETA model, 
(Altman et al., 1977) argue that there are financial variables that are good default 
predictors and that behave similarly for manufacturers and trading companies such 
that both can be analyzed on an equal basis. The Z’’-score of (Altman, 1993) is 
based on the same reasoning. As our goal is not to derive a perfect credit scoring 
system for the Deutsche Bundesbank dataset, we believe that our assumption will 
not affect results in an adverse way. 
We also assume that banks determine credit scores and default probabilities 
exclusively based on annual accounts information. They do not add any qualitative 
information. The inclusion of qualitative factors is not a prerequisite for admittance to 
the internal-ratings based approach of Basel II.
9 Yet, many banks base their internal 
credit ratings on some qualitative components like management quality.
10 Since we 
do not have any additional qualitative information in our dataset, we might 
underestimate system performance, particularly for small banks. Given a credit 
quality threshold derived on data without taking into account qualitative information, 
                                                 
9 (Basel Committee, 2003), § 379 
10 (Basel Committee, 2000) surveyed large international banks. Most banks assign ratings using 
considerable judgmental elements. The relative importance of qualitative versus quantitative factors 
ranged from very minor to more than 60%. (Günther and G rüning, 2000) report that 72 of 146 
surveyed German banks use qualitative criteria for default prediction. 38 of 49 banks state that the 
quality of default prediction has been improved by the inclusion of qualitative factors.  
 
- 9 - 
small banks would violate the threshold more often and would consequently be put 
under additional investigation more frequently. Considering that it is more difficult to 
evaluate the quality of systems that largely rely on qualitative information, this 
consequence might even be desirable. 
The six systems we define are designed to reflect different approaches to system 
calibration. We expect some of these approaches to result in inferior system quality, 
while others may not differ significantly from a benchmark model. The systems differ 
in their use of different information sources in the process of system calibration. 
Information can be  
•  internal to the bank,  
•  external to the bank, but internal to the economy (represented by the Deutsche 
Bundesbank database), or  
•  external to both bank and economy. 
In the stepwise system, banks completely rely on their own data. In the trivial and the 
optimized Altman system financial variables are determined external to bank and 
economy, while weights are derived on the bank’s data. The benchmark variables 
system uses information that is external to the bank, but internal to the economy to 
select financial variables, and information internal to the bank to derive weights. The 
Z-score and the pooled system are calibrated without any reference to a bank’s own 
data base, but relying on information internal to the economy. 
2.1 The trivial system 
The trivial system represents the bottom end of our quality scale. Banks simply draw 
one financial variable by chance and use logistic regression to derive credit scores 
and default probabilities from this single variable. There is no doubt that this system’s 
quality is inadequate such that it should always be detected as being of inferior 
quality.  
2.2 The optimized Altman and the Z-score system 
The Altman Z -score as well as its claim to be applicable in a broad range of 
applications is widely known. Yet, as accounting variables are differently defined in 
Germany than in the U.S., it does not seem reasonable to apply the specific credit  
 
- 10 - 
scoring function without modifications. The optimized Altman and the Z-score system 
represent two ways banks might use to apply the Z-score to German data.  
The optimized Altman system is defined by taking the financial ratios of Altman’s Z’’-
score, and deriving the financial ratios’ optimal weights by a logistic regression based 
on a bank’s own dataset.  
The Altman Z’’-score is a modified version of the (Altman, 1968) Z-score, and is 
designed to account better for private companies and industry effects.
11 It consists of 
four financial variables: working capital / total assets (V22), retained earnings / total 
assets (V49), earnings before interest and taxes / total assets (V46), and book value 
of equity / book value of total liabilities (V25).  
As will be seen in the description of the pooled system, none of these variables 
works particularly well with the Deutsche Bundesbank database. Therefore, we 
expect the quality of this system to be rather low, although better than that of the 
trivial system. 
The Z-score system can be seen as the research output of a credit risk researcher 
who applies the design of the Altman Z-score to German data. The result is a specific 
logistic credit scoring function, which banks may opt to use. The system is based on 
information on the 39 largest defaulters from the Deutsche Bundesbank database 
and 39 randomly drawn non-defaulters, both satisfying the size criterion of revenues 
larger than fifty million Euros. Financial variables are chosen by a logistic stepwise 
selection procedure (with a significance level of 5%). The credit scoring function 
contains six financial variables (V8, V10, V28, V30, V34, and V42) covering 
revenues, profitability, equity, debt, and short-term debt.  
Banks using this system need to correct the average predicted default probability of 
50% to correspond to the bank’s actual in-sample default rate. Banks perform this 
prior correction by replacing the intercept  o b ˆ of the logistic regression function by the 
consistent corrected estimate 
œ
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11 (Altman, 1993), p. 204f  
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where t  is the fraction of defaults in the bank’s sample, and  5 . 0 = y  is the fraction of 
defaults in the sample which was used to derive the credit scoring function.
12 This 
correction will usually not be completely successful (because datasets differ). 
Therefore, banks scale all predicted default probabilities linearly such that average 
predicted default probabilities coincide with average actual default rates.
13 
It is not clear a priori whether the Z-score system performs better than the optimized 
Altman system. The advantage that the Z -score system selects financial variables 
based on the Deutsche Bundesbank database may be offset by the large company 
bias and the small sample size.  
2.3 The stepwise system 
In the stepwise system banks rely completely on their own data. They select from a 
set of financial variables by a logistic stepwise selection procedure, and then apply 
logistic regression to derive credit scores and default probabilities.  
In choosing a significant level for the stepwise selection procedure, we take into 
account the lack of independence between firm-year observations. We apply a 
conservative procedure proposed by (Shumway, 2001) and multiply the value of the 
partial F test statistic, which is necessary to obtain a confidence level of 90%, by the 
average number of firm-years per company in each training sample. We use these 
new values of the partial F test as thresholds to decide on the significance of a 
variable.  
The average number of financial ratios chosen by the stepwise selection procedures 
varies from about one for banks with three out-of-time defaults to about six for banks 
with 102 out-of-time defaults. We expect t he stepwise system to be particularly 
favourable for large banks, while small banks might not be able to achieve a high 
quality because of their small databases. 
                                                 
12 (Manski and Lerman, 1977) 
13 This is similar to the approach in (Falkenstein et al., 2000), p. 15.  
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2.4 The benchmark variables and the pooled system 
The benchmark variables system represents the best rating system available for 
banks in our study. The story for this system is that bank regulators publish a set of 
financial ratios which they believe work well in measuring credit risk without revealing 
the specific form of the credit scoring function. This is done, for example, by 
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 1999). 
The benchmark variables system consists of six financial ratios (V1, V16, V34, V39, 
V42, V43). Two of these ratios are also part of the Z-score system (V34, V42). The 
financial ratios were chosen based on the pooled system to be described next. V8 
was dropped because it is structurally similar to V34. 
The pooled system is only available to bank regulators that have access to a 
database of annual accounts and defaults covering the whole economy  (like in 
Germany or France). In order to assess internal credit rating systems, regulators 
need to have an intuition about a good system’s performance. Is a system with an 
area under curve of 80% extraordinarily good or only average? Regulators may use 
their own database to develop this intuition by calibrating some sort of a benchmark 
model. To be clear, this benchmark model is not meant to be the perfect credit 
scoring model for the economy in question. In this case every bank would be well 
advised to use it. The only purpose of the benchmark model is to help regulators in 
their task of evaluating system quality.  
In our study, the pooled system serves as the benchmark model. The pooled system 
is derived on the complete Deutsche Bundesbank training sample  using the 
procedure defined for the stepwise system. It consists of seven variables (V1, V8, 
V16, V34, V39, V42, and V43). The danger of overfitting is low due to the large 
dataset and the strict entry criterion for the stepwise selection procedure.  
3.  Quantitative measures of system quality 
For each kind of internal credit rating system, we simulate the distribution of 
quantitative measures summarizing the system’s quality. We consider three different 
measures: the area-under-curve (AUC) of the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) 
curve, the Brier score, and the grouped Brier score.   
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3.1 Area-under-curve (AUC) 
The AUC measures the quality of ranking borrowers from high to low default risk. If 
low credit scores are defined to indicate high default probabilities, then all borrowers 
that actually defaulted in a learning sample should be assigned a relatively low credit 
score, and those that did not default a relatively high credit score. The AUC is only 
concerned with ranking, and does not assess the accuracy  of default probability 
estimates. 
Under what circumstances is such a measure useful? The ranking of borrowers is 
sufficient for credit risk management if banks are not able to charge different credit 
risk premiums for different customers in the market.
14 In this case, banks maximize 
their risk-adjusted returns by not granting credit to customers with negative expected 
returns which is equivalent to defining a minimum credit score. Yet, this line of 
thought does not lead us to the AUC as a measure of system quality, but to the 
concept of minimized expected error costs.
15 The AUC measures the quality of the 
complete ranking and not only of one threshold. Only if the threshold is difficult to 
define in practice, the AUC may be a sensible measure. 
If banks are able to charge customer-specific risk premiums in the market, then the 
quality of the ranking of borrowers can serve as an approximation to the quality of 
default probability estimates. At least, borrowers with a low credit score ought to have 
a higher default probability than those with a high credit score. Yet, in this case the 
Brier score discussed in the next section is more appropriate. 
Formally, the AUC is derived from the ROC curve. The ROC curve is obtained by 
sorting credit scores from low to high, and plotting the empirical distribution function 
(EDF) of scores of non-defaulting companies on the x-axis, and the EDF of scores of 
defaulting companies on the y -axis. If low scores are defined to indicate a high 
default probability, then x-values represent the error rate that a solvent company is 
classified as insolvent (type-II error) and y-values represent one minus the error rate 
that an insolvent company is classified as solvent (type-I error). Thus, the ROC curve 
is a complete representation of type-I  and type-II errors. The area under the ROC 
                                                 
14 For example, this is the case in consumer credit as described in (Jacobson and Roszbach, 2003). 
15 As developed for linear discriminant analysis by (Joy and Tollefson, 1975).  
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curve (AUC) is a summarizing accuracy measure. It is equivalent to the two 
independent sample Mann-Whitney non-parametric test statistic  qˆ, which estimates 
the probability that the score of  a randomly chosen defaulted company from the 
sample of defaulted companies is (correctly) lower than the score of a randomly 
chosen solvent company from the sample of solvent companies: 
￿ =
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with  ND D s s ,  being the score of a defaulter and a non-defaulter, respectively. The sum 
in (2) is taken over all pairs of defaulters and non-defaulters  ) , ( ND D  in the sample.
16 
The AUC ranges from 0% to 100%. A perfect AUC value of 100% is attained if 
exactly those borrowers defaulting in the future receive the lowest credit scores. A 
value of  below 50% would mean that the system performs worse than a system 
which randomly allocates credit scores to borrowers. 
(DeLong et al., 1988) provide for an asymptotically valid test of the hypothesis that 
the AUC values of two different systems calculated on the same dataset are equal. 
3.2 Brier score 
The Brier score  B is not only concerned with the ranking of borrowers, but also with 
the accuracy of default probability estimates. It is defined as 
n
I p
B
n
i i i ￿ = -
=
1
2 ) ˆ (
,                        (4) 
where  i p ˆ  is a system’s default probability estimate for borrower i,  n i ,..., 1 = , and  i I  is 
the indicator variable of default (1 if default, zero otherwise). 
                                                 
16 (DeLong et al., 1988). The notation is taken from (Engelmann et al., 2003).  
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The Brier score relies on a quadratic loss function, which is often used in economics. 
Other scoring rules are available. An important property of the Brier score is that it is 
a strictly proper scoring rule, meaning that banks minimize their expected score by 
reporting their probability estimates honestly.
17 
The Brier score ranges from zero (defaulters are attached a default probability of 
100% percent and non-defaulters one of 0%) to some maximum value (defaulters are 
attached a default probability of zero percent and non-defaulters one of 100%). A 
system with an AUC of 100% does not necessarily have a Brier score of zero, as 
default probabilities for defaulters will mostly be below 100%, and those for non-
defaulters above zero. Vice versa, a system with a Brier score of zero will also have 
an AUC of 100% showing that the Brier score evaluates ranking accuracy plus the 
accuracy of default probability estimates. 
(Bloch, 1990) provides for a test of the hypothesis that the Brier scores of two 
different internal credit rating systems calculated on the same dataset are equal.  
As indicated in the previous section, the Brier score may be more appropriate in 
settings in which banks are able to charge customer-specific credit risk premiums. As 
credit markets develop into this direction, and as it is one goal of the Basel II reform 
that banks price their loans according to the borrower’s risk, the Brier score seems to 
dominate the AUC.  
One disadvantage of the Brier score is that it strongly depends on the overall default 
rate level in a given sample. Therefore, the Brier score of a low-risk bank cannot 
directly be compared with that of a high-risk bank. So-called skill scores are 
proposed in the literature to make scores comparable that result from systems with 
different event probabilities. A system’s Brier score is compared with the score of an 
unsophisticated system, e.g. by measuring the percentage improvement over the 
unsophisticated system or simply the difference in scores. Unfortunately, these 
modified scoring rules are not strictly proper and / or change with linear 
transformations.
18 
                                                 
17 Cf. (Winkler, 1994). 
18 Cf. (Winkler, 1994)  
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(Winkler, 1994) proposes an asymmetric scoring rule to standardize scores in a way 
such that the property of being strictly proper is retained. We implemented the 
application of this scoring rule to  the Brier score. The unsophisticated system is 
represented by a system that uses the average in-sample default rate as individual 
default probability estimate for each borrower. We find that the standardization 
works, but the power is lower than that of the unmodified Brier score.  
The main problem of applying the Winkler-proposal to credit risk is the difficulty to 
motivate the asymmetrical treatment of default probability forecasts. With respect to 
defaulters, a system is increasingly punished the lower i ts default probability 
forecasts are; a treatment which is intuitive. Yet, if default probability forecasts drop 
below the forecast of the trivial system, the punishment becomes a lot more severe 
(compare Winkler, 1994, Figure 2). The opposite holds for non-defaulters. The 
punishment increases with the default probability forecast, but it increases much 
slower if the default probability forecast exceeds the forecast of the trivial system. 
Because this asymmetrical treatment lacks a motivation, we stick to the original Brier 
score. We take its dependence on overall default rates into account by simulating 
thresholds depending on bank size and portfolio default rate (see Table 5, Panel B). 
3.3 Grouped Brier score 
Under Basel II, banks will have to construct at least eight rating classes. Most banks 
will estimate an average default probability for each rating class (usually derived from 
historical rating class default rates), and use these default probabilities to calculate 
capital requirements. Bank regulators will therefore be interested in the precision of 
these rating class-specific default probability estimates.  
The grouped Brier score  gB measures exactly this precision. It is defined as  
G
p p
gB
G
g g g ￿ = -
=
1
2 ) ˆ (
,                      (5) 
where  g p ˆ  is the mean default probability estimate for borrowers of rating class 
G g ,..., 1 = , and  g p  is the actual default rate of borrowers in rating class g .  
The grouped Brier score is positioned between the Brier score, which measures 
system quality if there are as many borrowers as rating classes, and a system with  
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just one rating class, in which case we simply measure the difference between the 
average default rate and the average default probability estimate. 
As such the grouped Brier score seems to represent the most adequate measure for 
our purposes. Yet, the following example shows that there is an important caveat. 
Consider two rating systems with two rating classes each. In the  first system 
defaulters are evenly distributed across the two rating classes, while in the second all 
defaulters are classified into one of the two classes. Both systems are assumed to be 
perfect at predicting rating class default probabilities. Thus, both systems will have a 
zero grouped Brier score. But the first system is obviously not much in line with the 
spirit of Basel II which calls for risk differentiation, while the second is.  
Confirming our reasoning, we find in our simulations that the grouped Brier score 
does not succeed at all in identifying inferior systems. As all of our systems are 
equally good at the task of predicting average rating class default rates, we do not 
treat the grouped Brier score any further. 
4.  Simulation set-up and results 
4.1 Simulation set-up 
Our economy consists of banks of four different sizes and of three different levels of 
portfolio default rates. We use in-sample bank sizes of 1,875, 3,750, 7,500, and 
15,000 observations in a bank’s 1994-1998 training sample. As each balance sheet 
in the training sample is counted as a separate observation, the number of 
companies per sample is less than the number of observations. There are on 
average 3.34 balance sheets per company such that the number of training sample 
companies ranges from 561 to 4,490.  
As levels of portfolio default rates, we use 0.85%, 1.7%, and 3.4%. The value of 
1.7% is taken from (Carey, 1998) as being a representative default rate for 
commercial loan portfolios of large U.S. banks.
19 Unfortunately, we do not have data 
on representative default rates of German credit portfolios. 
                                                 
19 Take the portfolio structure for commercial loan portfolios of large U.S. banks in (Carey, 1998), p. 
1380 and multiply it with default probabilities given in Table III, Panel B, second column.  
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The 1999 out-of-time sample of each bank consists of all companies that are part of 
the training sample and that stay customers in 1999. In addition, we simulate new 
business by randomly drawing new customers such that the bank’s portfolio size and 
portfolio default rate stays constant. In doing this, we construct the situation that the 
out-of-time sample reflects an average year.
20 
By defining portfolio size and portfolio default rate, we also lock in the number of 
defaults in a credit portfolio. The number of defaults is the single most important 
variable influencing system quality. A relatively high default rate does not result in a 
good system, if the portfolio is relatively small. As well, a large portfolio does not 
result in a good system, if the default rate is relatively low.  
We define six different classes of number of defaults (in-sample: 16, 32, 64, 128, 
255, out-of-time: 3, 6, 13, 26, 51, 102; cf. Table 3). Later on, we will see that it is 
possible to state most results depending on the number of defaults instead of bank 
size / portfolio default rate combinations. 
For each company, banks have access to the complete annual accounts history as it 
is available in the Deutsche Bundesbank database. For each bank size / portfolio 
default rate combination, we randomly draw 1,000 credit portfolio compositions 
representing different banks.  
This procedure is based on two assumptions: first, banks do not specialize in regions 
or industries; second, banks are not able to collect additional annual accounts data to 
improve their credit scoring performance.  
The first assumption will not be true especially for small banks that are often 
regionally focused. As a consequence, we may underestimate t he credit scoring 
performance of small banks relative to large banks that are more diversified. The 
second assumption also concerns small banks that only have few defaults in their 
training samples such that they obtain a credit scoring with low predictive power. 
                                                 
20 Standard credit scoring models do not address the question of systematic risk factors influencing 
the level of default rates. We do not treat the problem of systematic risk in this paper, as under Basel II 
systematic risk is addressed by introducing an asset value model with a relatively high asset 
correlation.  
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While we use the first assumption to simplify our analysis, the second assumption 
can be motivated to some extent by high costs of gathering additional annual 
accounts and default information especially for private companies.  
4.2 Scores + logistic default probabilities vs. ratings + historical default rates 
Today, most banks use credit scoring systems to classify borrowers into a set of 
rating classes defined by a range of credit scores.
21 By aggregating borrowers into 
rating classes, additional information inherent in credit scores is lost.  
In addition, banks often do not transform credit scores into individual default 
probabilities parametrically, but rather apply historical rating class default rates to all 
borrowers in a rating class.
22 
We examine the question, whether banks are able to improve system quality if they 
use credit scores instead of ratings to rank borrowers, and if they use logistic 
regression estimates instead of average historical rating class default rates to 
determine individual default probabilities. 
For this purpose, we conduct  ?
2-tests of the null hypothesis that the difference 
between the mean values of our quality measures is equal comparing the two cases 
described above: 
) 1 ( ~
2
) ( 2
12
2
2
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-
                      (6) 
Table 4 summarizes the p-values of these tests depending on system type, bank 
size, and portfolio default rate.  
In Panel A, the AUC derived from credit scores is compared with the AUC derived 
from credit ratings. Only for some medium-sized and large banks with medium or 
                                                 
21 For simplicity, we define a set of eight rating classes of equal size. This is the Basel II minimum 
number, (Basel Committee, 2003), § 366. 
22 Historical rating class default rates can either be obtained from a bank’s internal default history or 
from external rating agency data. The latter source is attractive because of long time series, yet it is 
often not applicable to non-U.S. banks because of a strong U.S. bias in the data.  
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high default rates, the p-value is below or equal to 10%. In these few cases the use 
of credit scores would significantly increase system quality.  
In Panel B, the Brier score based on logistic default probabilities is compared with the 
one based on average historical rating class default rates. Again, there are some 
cases in which the null hypothesis is rejected, but in these cases the difference is 
positive favouring the Brier score based on historical default rates. 
Based on this evidence, banks do not have an incentive to change the methods 
currently u sed. Results in the following sections will consequently be based on 
current behaviour. 
4.3 Identification of inferior internal credit rating systems 
We propose two different procedures to identify inferior internal credit rating systems. 
In the first procedure, systems are classified as inferior if their AUC or Brier score is 
worse than a given threshold. Banks simply submit their statistics to the bank 
regulator, who evaluates the system. The regulator does not have to publish neither 
the threshold nor any information about the way thresholds are derived. 
The second procedure is more complex. The AUC or Brier score needs to be 
calculated for the bank’s own system and the regulator’s benchmark system, both 
based on the bank’s credit portfolio. Bank regulators set a lower threshold on the p-
value of the test of equality of the two statistics such that all banks whose system 
performs worse than the benchmark system and whose p -value falls below the 
threshold are classified as inferior systems.  
This procedure  is more difficult to put into practice. Either the regulator has to 
distribute her benchmark system to banks, which might give the impression that 
regulators arrogate to have the best system, or banks have to submit a large amount 
of data to regulators. Additional costs are generated, if regulators need financial 
ratios not produced by a bank’s system by default. 
Therefore, the first procedure will be preferred if it is sufficiently powerful. The main 
task to be solved for both procedures is the derivation of threshold values, which is 
explained along with simulation results in the next two sections.  
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4.3.1 Using critical thresholds on AUC values and Brier scores 
To identify inferior internal credit rating systems, supposedly inferior systems need to 
be compared with a predefined benchmark system. We use the pooled system as the 
benchmark system as it is calibrated on the largest information set.
23  
Critical thresholds are derived as quantiles of the quality measure’s distribution for 
the pooled system. For the AUC, we use the 10%-quantile such that lower values 
indicate inferiority. For the Brier score, we use the 90%-quantile such that higher 
values indicate inferiority. 
Simulations are carried out for all bank size / portfolio default rate combinations 
specified in Table 3. The analysis of simulation results reveals that the probability to 
identify an inferior system predominantly depends on the number of out-of-time 
defaults and not on the specific bank size / portfolio default rate combination.  
For the AUC, it is even possible to express thresholds only depending on the number 
of defaults, while for the Brier score, thresholds are expressed depending on the 
bank size / portfolio default rate combination (cf. discussion in section 3.2). 
Table 5 presents out-of-time simulation results. For the AUC, the trivial system is 
always identified as an inferior system with a probability of at least 50%. For the 
optimized Altman system, this holds only for large banks and for medium-sized banks 
if default rates are high. The Z -score-system is identified as inferior with a high 
probability if the bank is large and the default rate is high.  
For the stepwise system, the identification rate decreases from 31% for small banks 
with low default rates to 4% for large banks with high default rates. This confirms our 
intuition that the stepwise system is not adequate for small banks, while for large 
banks it is superior to the pooled system. As out-of-time samples primarily consist of 
the same borrowers as training samples, large banks using the stepwise system 
benefit relative to using the pooled system. 
                                                 
23 If regulators are not able to calibrate the pooled system because they lack data, they might use the 
benchmark variables or the stepwise system instead. The power to identify inferior systems will 
decrease using these systems.  
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For the Brier score, results are similar. Identification frequencies are lower for small 
banks and medium-sized banks with low default rates using the trivial system and 
higher for large banks and medium-sized banks with high default rates using the Z-
score system. 
4.3.2 Using critical thresholds on p-values 
In Table 6, simulation results are shown for the procedure that inferior systems are 
identified based on a lower p-value threshold.  
Each bank performs a test of the null hypothesis that the AUC or Brier score of its 
own system is equal to the respective values of the regulator’s system. Regulators 
set the critical p-value such that at least half of the banks using the optimized Altman 
system are identified as using an inferior system. Statistically, this means that the 
threshold equals the median of the p-value distribution resulting from comparing the 
optimized Altman with the pooled system conditioned on the fact that the optimized 
Altman system performs worse than the pooled system. 
Results in Table 6 for the trivial system look similar to results presented in Table 5. 
The trivial system is always identified as inferior with a high probability. For small 
banks and for medium-sized banks with low or medium default rates the power is 
even higher, if the test is based on p-values rather than on the AUC or Brier score 
itself. Yet, it must be taken into account that in these cases the benchmark variables 
system is also identified as  inferior with a high probability. Therefore, the 
discriminatory power of the test is not very high for these bank types. 
Is the procedure based on p-values better than the procedure based on critical AUC 
and Brier score thresholds? 
To answer this question, we set the critical p-values such that the power to identify 
the optimized Altman system as inferior is equal to the power shown in Table 5.  
Results given in Table 7 are mixed. Identification frequencies are lower for the trivial 
system and higher for the Z-score system. Overall, the performance of the p-value 
approach and the critical AUC / Brier score approach seem to be similar. Differences 
of some percentage points may be due to simulation noise.  
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4.4 Capital requirements depending on system quality 
We now address the question how the quality of internal credit rating systems 
influences Basel II capital requirements. First, we will look at absolute capital 
requirements depending on system quality. Then, we will pick up our question 
whether it is preferable for banks to derive default probability estimates based on 
historical rating class default rates instead of using logistic default probability 
estimates. If capital requirements are lower using logistic regression estimates, then 
banks might have a reason to adjust their models.  
In Table 8, capital requirements (C) are calculated based on the latest Basel II 
proposal:
24 
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where  R is the asset correlation,  PD is the default probability estimate, and  S  
equals sales in million Euros. We have to take into account the firm-size adjustment 
for small- and medium-sized entities as the median firm size in the Deutsche 
Bundesbank database equals 17 million Euros. The loss given default is set to 45%, 
and the maturity to 2.5 years. 
Panel A shows that in-sample capital requirements roughly increase with decreasing 
system quality.
25 They are lowest for the benchmark variables system, and highest 
for the trivial system. Inferior systems, i.e. systems that are not able to discriminate 
well between high- and low-risk borrowers, are actually punished by higher capital 
                                                 
24 (Basel Committee, 2003), § 241-242 
25  We deliberately show in-sample results here, because all systems are perfectly calibrated in-
sample. Average in-sample default probabilities equal average in-sample default rates. Yet, the same 
behaviour can also be seen out-of-time.  
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requirements. The reason for this behaviour is due to the concavity of the capital 
requirements function. 
For example, consider a portfolio of borrowers, each of which having sales of 17 
million Euros, and an average default probability of 1.7%. If the rating system is not 
at all able to differentiate between risks, then it effectively consists of only one rating 
class yielding a capital requirement of 8.1%. If it is able to differentiate between risks 
such that there is one rating class with an average default probability of 0.17% 
containing 90% of the borrowers, and one with a default probability of 15.47% 
containing 10% of the borrowers, then the capital requirement equals only 4.7%. 
The trivial system almost performs as bad as if it effectively produces only one rating 
class, while the benchmark variables system is not quite as good as the second 
system in the example. 
The observation that capital requirements based on historical default rates increase 
with bank size is primarily caused by the fact that there often are no defaults in the 
high-quality rating classes of small banks. As the curvature of the capital requirement 
function is strongest for very low default probabilities, capital requirements are 
comparatively low for small banks even if the minimum default probability of 0.03% is 
imposed. 
In Panel B, we report median differences in capital requirements if default 
probabilities are estimated from logistic regression instead of historical rating class 
default rates.  
Except for the Z-score system all differences are positive independent of bank size 
and portfolio default rate. Median differences range from 0.1% to 0.7%. For the Z -
score system, differences are negative, ranging from  -0.9% to -1.5%. The Z -score 
system probably behaves differently because it is the only system for which we carry 
out a large prior correction (from 50% to 0.85%-3.4%). These calculations take into 
account the minimum default probability of 0.03% for the calculation of capital 
requirements. Otherwise differences would even be higher. 
The reason for these differences lies in the fact that the capital requirement is a 
concave function of the default probability, and that the logistic regression produces 
systematic estimation errors depending on the level of the default rate. For the Z -
score system (all other systems) it underestimates (overestimates) default rates if  
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they are relatively low while overestimating (underestimating) default rates if they are 
relatively high. Due to the concavity of the capital requirement function, small 
differences between predicted and historical rating class default rates l ead to 
relatively large differences in capital requirements if historical rating class default 
rates are low, and large differences between predicted and historical rating class 
default rates lead to relatively small differences in capital requirements if  historical 
rating class default rates are high. On average, we obtain the differences in capital 
requirements reported in Panel B of Table 8. 
Thus, only banks using the Z-score system benefit from using logistic regression 
default probabilities instead of historical rating class default rates. Banks using any 
other system have to have more capital. As in most of our analyses the Z -score 
system is not identified as an inferior system, there actually is a chance for banks to 
reduce their capital requirements  without a significant loss in system quality. Yet, 
there are other considerations to be taken into account. For example, a bank using 
the Z-score system might not be able to charge the relatively high credit spreads to 
risky borrowers. Losing these borrowers will lead to a situation in which the system is 
not calibrated any more, reducing the system’s quality and increasing the probability 
of being detected as an inferior system. 
Results in Panel B depend on the particular function which logistic regression uses to 
transform credit scores into default probabilities. Our simulations show that this bias 
also exists with probit regression and parametric linear discriminant analysis. It could 
be removed by using a non-parametric approach.
26 
5. Conclusion 
Based on a large database of Deutsche Bundesbank, we examined quantitative 
measures summarizing the quality of internal credit rating systems. Our main result is 
that both the AUC and the Brier score are valuable statistics in identifying low-quality 
systems. Which statistic should bank regulators choose? While the AUC dominates 
the current discussion, we believe that the Brier score measures more closely those 
errors that are important for capital regulation. Capital requirements are based on 
default probability estimates and not on the ranking of borrowers. Therefore, capital 
                                                 
26 For example, cf. (Hausman et al., 1998), p. 250ff  
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requirements are correct only if default probability estimates are correct. As it is 
current practice that default probabilities are estimated for rating classes and not on 
an individual base, we also considered the grouped Brier score as an evaluation 
measure. The problem with the grouped Brier score is that it is only concerned with 
precision. It does not at all evaluate a system’s ability to discriminate between high- 
and low-risk borrowers. 
Other results of our study are that banks do not significantly improve system quality if 
they do not aggregate credit scores into rating classes, or if they use logistic 
regression to estimate default probabilities instead of historical rating class default 
rates. If banks are not able to discriminate between high- and low-risk borrowers, 
they increase their average capital requirements due to the concavity of the capital 
requirements function. The use of parametric methods to derive default probabilities 
from credit scores might lead to an over- or underestimation of capital requirements 
relative to using historical rating class default rates. 
An interesting question for future research is how the power of identifying low-quality 
internal credit rating systems will develop as more data becomes available over time. 
In this paper, we used a training sample covering five years which is the minimum 
amount of data allowed under Basel II after the transition period. As our data covers 
the years 1990-2000, we are actually able to investigate this issue by starting with a 
training sample from 1990 to 1995, and then increasing the sample by additional 
years. Increasing training samples might lead to an improved average system 
performance, while the pooling of validation samples might also lead to improved 
validation results. 
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Table 1: Financial ratios used as independent variables in credit scoring 
Financial variables are taken from Niehaus (1987), Hüls (1995), Deutsche 
Bundesbank (1999), and Altman (1968) (cf. footnote to table). The column 
‘Hypothesis’ indicates whether the value of the financial variable is expected to be 
generally lower or higher, respectively, for insolvent (I) observations than for solvent 
(S) observations. 
Variable  Ratio  Hypothesis 
V1  operating profit (before taxes) / revenues  I < S 
V2  EBITDA (excl. extraordinary items) / revenues  I < S 
V3  earnings before financial expenses / total assets  I < S 
V4  operating profit (before taxes and financial expenses) / total assets  I < S 
V5  EBITDA (excl. extraordinary items) / total assets  I < S 
V6  (EBITDA (excl. extraordinary items) + financial expenses) / total assets  I < S 
V7  EBITDA (incl. extraordinary items) / total assets  I < S 
V8  (revenues – expenses for raw materials and supplies – amortization of fixed 
assets – other operating expenses) / total assets 
I < S 
V9  EBITDA (incl. extraordinary items) / revenues  I < S 
V10  EBITDA (excl. extraordinary items) / total debt  I < S 
V11  EBITDA (incl. extraordinary items) / total debt  I < S 
V12  EBITDA (excl. extraordinary items) / (total debt – cash)  I < S 
V13  EBITDA (incl. extraordinary items) / (total debt – cash)  I < S 
V14  EBITDA (excl. extraordinary items) / (total debt – cash – securities – trade 
receivables) 
I < S 
V15  EBITDA (incl. extraordinary items) / (total debt – cash – securities – trade 
receivables) 
I < S 
V16  EBITDA (excl. extraordinary items) / short-term debt  I < S 
V17  EBITDA (incl. extraordinary items) / short-term debt  I < S 
V18  (short-term debt * 360) / revenues  I > S 
V19  (trade payables + liabilities from accepted bills) * 360 / revenues  I > S 
V20   (cash + securities + trade receivables) / short-term debt  I < S 
V21  working assets / short-term debt  I < S 
V22  (working assets – short-term debt) / total assets  I < S 
V23  (working assets – short-term debt) / revenues  I < S 
V24  (cash + securities + trade receivables – short-term debt) / (operating expenses 
– amortization of fixed assets) 
I < S 
V25  adjusted equity capital / total assets  I < S 
V26  (equity capital + total earnings) / total assets  I < S 
V27  adjusted equity capital / total debt  I < S 
V28  (equity capital + total earnings) / total debt  I < S 
V29  short-term debt / total assets  I > S  
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Table 1: Financial ratios used as independent variables in credit scoring 
(continued)
27 
Variable  Ratio  Hypothesis 
V30  short-term bank debt / total debt  I > S 
V31  (adjusted equity capital + pension provisions + long-term debt) / long-term 
assets 
I < S 
V32  adjusted equity capital / (total assets – cash – properties)  I < S 
V33  adjusted equity capital / (fixed assets – properties)  I < S 
V34  revenues / total assets  I < S 
V35  (debt from accepted bills + trade payables) * 12 / expenses for raw materials 
and supplies 
I > S 
V36  trade receivables * 12 / revenues  I > S 
V37  finished goods * 12 / revenues  I > S 
V38  raw materials and supplies * 12 / expenses for raw materials and supplies  I > S 
V39  amortization / (fixed assets + reductions of fixed assets + amortization)  I < S 
V40  investments / (fixed assets + reductions of fixed assets + amortization – 
investments) 
I < S 
V41  investments / amortization  I < S 
V42  (adjusted equity capital + provisions/2) / total assets  I < S 
V43  (trade payables + debt from accepted bills + bank debt) / (total debt – received 
advance payments) 
I > S 
V44  (trade receivables + inventories) / revenues  I > S 
V45  (adjusted equity capital + pension provisions) / total assets  I < S 
V46  earnings before taxes on income and interest paid / total assets  I < S 
V47  earnings before taxes on income / adjusted equity capital  I < S 
V48  net interest result / revenues  I < S 
V49  retained earnings / total assets  I < S 
  
 
                                                 
27 Variables V1-V41 are taken from (Niehaus, 1987, p. 75-76). The variable 21 of (Niehaus, 1987) is 
not sufficiently defined so that we do not use it. V42-44 are from (Hüls, 1995), p. 241, Table 22. (V42 = 
K_122, V43 = K_68A, V44 = K_85) The variable K_08EP cannot be calculated because we do not 
have data on the change in pension provisions, but V5 is very similar. The variable K_35 = V19, and 
the variable K_79 = V34. V45-48 are from (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1999), p. 55. (V45 = 
Equity/pension provision ratio, V46 = Return on total capital employed, V47 = Return on equity, V48 = 
Net interest rate) The capital recovery rate cannot be calculated because it is not sufficiently defined. 
The equity ratio equals V26. V49 is taken from (Altman, 1968).  
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Table 2: Overview of rating system types 
Name  Description 
Trivial  Bank randomly draws one financial variable from set of 49 
variables, and derives optimal logistic credit scoring 
function based on its own data. 
Optimized Altman  Bank takes financial variables of Altman’s Z’’-score 
calibrated on US data, and derives optimal logistic credit 
scoring function based on its own data. 
Z-score  Bank applies logistic credit scoring function derived on a 
sample of the 39 largest defaulters in the Deutsche 
Bundesbank database (revenues > 50 million Euros) and 
39 randomly drawn non-defaulters of the same size. No 
reference to bank’s own data. 
Stepwise  Bank selects financial variables by logistic stepwise 
selection procedure, and derives optimal logistic credit 
scoring function based on its own data. 
Benchmark variables  Bank uses a set of six financial variables that work well for 
the complete dataset, and derives optimal logistic credit 
scoring function based on its own data. 
Pooled  Logistic credit scoring function derived on the complete 
learning sample. Serves as benchmark function to evaluate 
all other systems. 
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Table 3: Overview of number of defaults resulting from bank size / portfolio 
default rate combinations 
  Portfolio default rate 
Bank size (# observations)  0.85% (low)  1.70% (medium)  3.40% (high) 
  In-sample 
1,875 (small)  16  32  64 
3,750 (medium I)  32  64  128 
7,500 (medium II)  64  128  255 
15,000 (large)  128  255  512 
  Out-of-time 
375 (small)  3  6  13 
750 (medium I)  6  13  26 
1,500 (medium II)  13  26  51 
3,000 (large)  26  51  102 
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Table 4: P-Values of ?
2-tests (Scores + logistic default probabilities vs. ratings + historical default rates) (in %) 
The table shows p-values of ?2-tests of the null hypothesis that the difference between two means equals zero. The (+)-sign indicates 
that the difference is positive. In Panel A, the AUC derived from credit scores is compared with the one derived from credit ratings. In 
Panel B, the Brier score based on individual logistic default probabilities is compared with the one based on average in-sample rating 
class default rates. Results are shown for five different systems (Trivial, Optimized Altman, Z-score, Stepwise, Benchmark variables), 
three levels of portfolio default rates (Low= 0.85%, Med= 1.7%, High= 3.4%), and four bank sizes (Small: 375 out-of-time 
observations, Med I: 750, Med II: 1,500, Large: 3,000), and are based on 1,000 out-of-time simulations.  
  Trivial  Optimized Altman  Z-score  Stepwise  Benchmark variables 
Bank 
size 
Low  Med  High  Low  Med  High  Low  Med  High  Low  Med  High  Low  Med  High 
Panel A                               
Small  84  87  83  79  77  64  78  68  53  86  71  52  62  51  30 
Med I  83  79  76  69  63  66  65  48  40  73  47  26  50  28  16 
Med II  80  72  68  68  62  56  46  27  20  45  20  9 (+)  32  16  3 (+) 
Large  68  62  52  55  59  40  25  10 (+)  1 (+)  17  5 (+)  1 (+)  14  4 (+)  0 (+) 
Panel B                               
Small  92  98  98  96  93  88  68  63  74  82  89  91  91  98  76 
Med I  98  91  81  99  86  74  49  51  60  85  90  90  100  81  63 
Med II  92  73  61  82  72  55  24  34  43  89  91  77  92  72  42 
Large  77  69  55  76  52  21  8 (+)  9 (+)  11  89  80  40  80  58  15  
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Table 5: Relative frequencies of identifying inferior systems using critical AUC and Brier score thresholds (in %) 
The table shows the relative frequency that a quality measure of a given system performs worse than a threshold value. In Panel A, 
the quality measure is the AUC, and lower thresholds (given in %) are derived as 10%-quantiles of the AUC distribution for the pooled 
system depending on the number of in-sample defaults. In Panel B, the quality measure is the Brier score, and upper thresholds 
(given in %) are derived as 90%-quantiles of the Brier score distribution for the pooled system depending on portfolio default rate and 
portfolio size. Results are shown for five different systems (Trivial, Optimized Altman, Z-score, Stepwise, Benchmark variables), and 
are based on 1,000 out-of-time simulations for each of twelve portfolio size / portfolio default rate combinations (see Table 3). 
# out-of-time defaults  Trivial  Optimized Altman  Z-score  Stepwise  Benchmark variables 
Panel A  Thresholds: 68-74-76-79-80-82 
3  50  28  14  31  13 
6  67  33  17  30  13 
13  79  38  19  23  11 
26  90  51  26  11  11 
51  97  75  44  6  10 
102  100  99  82  4  12 
Panel B  Thresholds: Low: 0.848-0.842-0.837-0.833, Medium: 1.664-1.646-1.634-1.626, High: 3.18-3.14-3.11-3.09 
3  26  18  13  24  14 
6  47  22  14  23  14 
13  77  33  22  26  14 
26  93  54  40  17  14 
51  99  85  72  12  15 
102  100  100  100  9  23  
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Table 6: Relative frequencies of identifying inferior systems using critical p-values I (in %) 
Panel A and B show the relative frequency that a p-value is smaller than a threshold value. The p-value results from a test that a 
quality measure for the bank’s own system is equal to the one for the pooled system based on a bank’s own dataset. Threshold values 
are set depending on bank size such that 50% of those banks using the Optimized Altman-system are identified as using inferior 
systems. In Panel A, the quality measure is the AUC. In Panel B, it is the Brier score. Results are shown for five different systems 
(Trivial, Optimized Altman, Z-score, Stepwise, Benchmark variables), and are based on 1,000 out-of-time simulations for each of 
twelve portfolio size / portfolio default rate combinations (see Table 3).  
# out-of-time defaults  Trivial  Optimized Altman  Z-score  Stepwise  Benchmark variables 
Panel A  Thresholds: 43-35-32-24-11-2.5 
3  66  50  47  55  49 
6  72  50  40  48  39 
13  81  50  41  44  27 
26  90  50  43  19  17 
51  92  50  41  3  5 
102  97  50  29  0  0 
Panel B  Thresholds: 30-23-16-10-3-2.5 
3  59  50  43  49  36 
6  66  50  43  47  29 
13  75  50  43  40  24 
26  86  50  47  20  15 
51  90  50  46  3  6 
102  95  50  34  0  0  
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Table 7: Relative frequencies of identifying inferior systems using critical p-values II (in %) 
Panel A and B show the relative frequency that a p-value is smaller than a threshold value. The p-value results from a test that a 
quality measure for the bank’s own system is equal to the one for the pooled system based on a bank’s own dataset. Threshold values 
are set depending on bank size such that the power for the optimized Altman system equals the one reported in Table 5. In Panel A, 
the quality measure is the AUC. In Panel B, it is the Brier score. Results are shown for five different systems (Trivial, Optimized 
Altman, Z-score, Stepwise, Benchmark variables), and are based on 1,000 out-of-time simulations for each of twelve portfolio size / 
portfolio default rate combinations (see Table 3).  
# out-of-time 
defaults 
Trivial  Optimized Altman  Z-score  Stepwise  Benchmark variables 
Panel A  Thresholds: 17-17-19-24-30-32 
3  46  28  24  31  19 
6  59  33  26  33  21 
13  74  38  30  33  18 
26  90  51  44  20  17 
51  96  75  67  8  14 
102  100  99  96  3  10 
Panel B  Thresholds: 9-8-8-11-11-6 
3  27  18  13  19  12 
6  38  22  15  20  10 
13  61  33  27  25  12 
26  88  54  50  23  17 
51  97  78  76  12  19 
102  100  99  98  2  14  
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Table 8: Capital requirements depending on system quality (in %) 
Panel A shows capital requirements depending on system type, bank size, and portfolio default rate. Panel B shows the median 
difference between capital requirements using individual logistic regression default probability estimates and historical rating class 
default rates. Results are based on in-sample data, which means that average portfolio default rates are equal to average predicted 
default probabilities for all models shown. Results are shown for five different systems (Trivial, Optimized Altman, Z-score, Stepwise, 
Benchmark variables), three levels of portfolio default rates (Low= 0.85%, Med= 1.7%, High= 3.4%), and four bank sizes (Small: 375 
out-of-time observations, Med I: 750, Med II: 1,500, Large: 3,000), and are based on 1,000 in-sample simulations. 
  Trivial  Optimized Altman  Z-score  Stepwise  Benchmark variables 
  Low  Med  High  Low  Med  High  Low  Med  High  Low  Med  High  Low  Med  High 
Panel A   
Small  5.2  7.3  10.0  4.7  6.6  9.4  4.4  6.1  8.6  4.5  6.3  8.7  4.1  5.8  8.4 
Med I  5.5  7.6  10.1  5.0  6.9  9.6  4.6  6.2  8.8  4.8  6.3  8.6  4.3  6.0  8.5 
Med II  5.7  7.6  10.2  5.1  7.0  9.7  4.7  6.3  8.8  4.7  6.1  8.6  4.4  6.1  8.6 
Large  5.7  7.6  10.2  5.2  7.1  9.7  4.7  6.3  8.9  4.5  6.1  8.6  4.5  6.1  8.6 
Panel B   
Small  0.7  0.6  0.2  0.6  0.7  0.4  -0.9  -1.1  -1.3  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.5 
Med I  0.4  0.3  0.1  0.4  0.4  0.2  -1.1  -1.3  -1.4  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.5  0.4 
Med II  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.3  0.3  0.1  -1.2  -1.3  -1.5  0.4  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.4  0.3 
Large  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.3  0.3  0.1  -1.2  -1.4  -1.5  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.3 
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